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The Implications of Psychological Research 
Related to Unconscious Discrimination and 
Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional 
Discrimination
Ivan E. Bodensteiner*
I. INTRODUCTION
In most cases alleging discrimination in violation of a federal statute or 
the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiff must prove disparate treatment, i.e., inten-
tional discrimination.  These cases arise under several federal statutes that 
prohibit race discrimination,1 including (a) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (Title VII),2 which prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, sex, national origin, color and religion; (b) the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
as amended in 1870 (§ 1981),3 which prohibits race discrimination in con-
tracting, including employment; (c) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VI),4 which prohibits race discrimination in programs receiving federal 
financial assistance, but addresses employment discrimination only where the 
federal funds are intended for employment; (d) the Fair Housing Act (FHA),5
which prohibits discrimination in housing based on race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, familial status and disability; (e) the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
as amended in 1870 (§ 1982),6 which prohibits race discrimination in prop-
erty transactions, including housing; and (f) the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(§ 1983),7 which provides a cause of action against state and local govern-
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
 1. Federal statutes addressing other types of discrimination also require the 
plaintiff to prove disparate treatment.  See, e.g., (a) the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA), which prohibits age discrimination in employment, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621-634; (b) the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits dis-
crimination based on a disability in employment as well as public accommodations 
and public (government) services, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; (c) § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act (§ 504), which addresses discrimination based on disability in programs 
receiving federal financial assistance, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and (d) Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), which prohibits sex discrimination by educa-
tional institutions receiving federal financial assistance, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (sometimes referred to as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871). 
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ment for individuals claiming discrimination in violation of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.8  While some of the statutes reach actions or practices that have a dis-
proportionate impact on a protected class or group,9 most plaintiffs filing a 
discrimination case allege disparate treatment. 
The Supreme Court requires plaintiffs asserting Equal Protection claims, 
as well as statutory disparate treatment claims, to prove intentional discrimi-
nation.  This means that showing only a disproportionate impact is not suffi-
cient to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.10  Rather, there 
must be proof “that the decisionmakers . . . acted with discriminatory pur-
pose,”11 which “implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences” and requires a showing that the decisionmaker “selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not mere-
ly ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”12  In its equal 
protection decisions, the Court has stressed the need for a discriminatory pur-
pose and this is consistent with the Court’s decisions in disparate treatment 
cases based on the antidiscrimination statutes.13  As the Court stated in 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., “[t]he ultimate question in 
every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treat-
 8. Such claims usually allege discrimination in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
 9. Most disparate impact cases are based on Title VII, with some based on the 
FHA and the ADEA.  Prior to 2005, when the Court held in Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228 (2005), that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims at least in 
limited circumstances, several circuits held that the ADEA does not reach disparate 
impact claims.  In Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Court determined 
that Title VI does not reach disparate impact; it also held that there is no implied pri-
vate right of action to enforce Title VI regulations that reach disparate impact. 
 10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 11. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (race discrimination chal-
lenge to the death penalty).  See also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (race discrimination challenge to the denial of a 
zoning request failed because the plaintiffs failed to prove “that discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor in the [challenged] decision.”). 
 12. Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (quoting 
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977)) (citations omitted) (sex 
discrimination challenge to veterans preference in hiring for state civil service posi-
tions).
 13. Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger points out that some lower courts in 
ADEA cases distinguish between motive and intent, and hold that a plaintiff can es-
tablish liability based on the ADEA without evidence of the employer’s state of mind, 
i.e., intent.  Instead, an impermissible motive, i.e., “what prompts a person to act or 
fail to act, is sufficient.”  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1170-71 (1995); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. 
Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and 
Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1056 (2006). 
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ment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”14
This means that “liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the 
ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer’s decision,”15
Much has been written in recent years about unconscious discrimination 
and implicit bias or stereotypes.16  This relatively recent research raises im-
portant questions about whether our antidiscrimination laws, at least as inter-
preted, are misguided insofar as they primarily address intentional discrimina-
tion at the point of the challenged decision,17 while much discrimination may 
be the result of implicit or unconscious stereotypes.  To the extent courts re-
quire plaintiffs to show intent at the point of the challenged decision, they 
have not adopted recent psychological and behavioral theories in understand-
ing the nature of discrimination.  A decisionmaker who chooses to make de-
cisions based on stereotypes rather than individual assessments,18 has made a 
conscious decision to disfavor members of a group he views negatively.  This 
decision to discriminate is implemented each time the decisionmaker ex-
cludes a candidate who is a member of a disfavored group.  At the point 
where the candidate is excluded the decisionmaker may have acted uncon-
sciously in the sense that the actual decision was predetermined. 
Taking into account recent psychological research related to implicit bi-
as and discrimination, this article will address proof of intent in disparate 
treatment cases.19  Part II of the article will examine a likely source of proof 
of discrimination – comments made by agents of the defendant.  Courts fre-
quently discount such comments, labeling them as “stray remarks”20 and 
 14. 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). 
 15. Id. at 141 (“the plaintiff’s age must have ‘actually played a role in [the em-
ployer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the out-
come.’” (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). 
 16. Many of these articles are cited in Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Antidiscrimination Law and Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006), 
which is critical of the implicit bias research: “We . . . detail the numerous problems 
of scientific validity that plague the research program and discuss the conceptual 
confusions within this body of work that undercut its credence both as legislative 
authority and litigation evidence.”  Id. at 1034. 
 17. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion) (focusing on “the actual moment of the event in question”); Krieger, 
supra note 13, at 1181-85. 
 18. See Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its 
Role in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT: THE LIMITS OF 
AWARENESS 253, 253-83 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989). 
 19. It is not the purpose of this article to enter the debate about the validity of the 
implicit prejudice research.  See Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 16.  Rather, this arti-
cle assumes the validity of the implicit bias research, but also assumes there remains 
much “old-fashioned,” intentional discrimination. 
 20. This unfortunate characterization is found in both the plurality opinion of 
Justice Brennan and the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor in Price Waterhouse 
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either excluding them as evidence or determining that they are insufficient to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment.  Derogatory comments directed at an 
individual, based on certain characteristics the speaker attributes to the indi-
vidual, provide substantial insight into how the speaker assesses people.  For 
this reason, such comments – even standing alone – provide direct evidence 
of purposeful or intentional discrimination and may be the only available 
evidence.21  It has also acknowledged a number of different methods of prov-
ing intentional discrimination.  Part III explores recent psychological research 
and theories, which question both the laws intended to address discrimination 
and the courts’ interpretations of them, as well as the proof schemes.  Assum-
ing plaintiffs alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or an antidis-
crimination statute must show intentional discrimination, Part IV discusses 
the implication of the psychological research in proving such discrimination, 
suggesting the existing proof schemes should be modified or adjusted, with 
more emphasis on the direct method and the mixed-motive defense. 
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO PROOF IN DISPARATE TREATMENT
CASES
To understand the shortcomings of the current approaches to proof in 
disparate treatment cases, it is necessary to discuss these approaches in some 
detail.  The courts have interpreted most antidiscrimination laws in a narrow 
fashion that is not required explicitly by the language of the statutes.  For 
example, Title VII makes it an  
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse 
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 280 (1989).  Justice Brennan said “the stereotyping in 
this case did not simply consist of stray remarks.”  Id. at 251.   Justice O’Connor said  
stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harass-
ment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or 
promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria.  Nor can statements 
by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the 
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this re-
gard.
Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 21. The Court has acknowledged the difficulty of proving such discrimination.  
See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) 
(“[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental proc-
esses” but the “law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person’s state of 
mind”); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“the entire 
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that 
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by”). 
2008] IMPLICIT BIAS & INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 87
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22
This language does not clearly require proof of purposeful or intentional dis-
crimination.  “It would be reasonable to interpret this language as simply 
requiring proof of causation without proof of intent,” so that a Title VII plain-
tiff would have to establish only that the protected status “made a difference” 
or “played a role” in the challenged employment decision.23  After noting that 
some courts have recognized the role of “unconscious application of stereo-
typed notions of ability” in age discrimination cases,24 Professor Krieger says  
[i]t is hard to understand why a court would assume that race dis-
crimination could not, as easily as age discrimination, result from 
the unconscious application of stereotyped notions of ability or 
other characteristics.  It is also difficult to understand why a court 
would assume that race discrimination results exclusively from a 
deliberate desire to exclude members of a particular racial group 
from the workforce.25
The courts’ questionable interpretation of Title VII and other antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, requiring most plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination,26 is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only intentional discrimina-
tion.27  The courts recognize two methods of proving intentional discrimina-
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  Other federal statutes use 
“because of” in identifying the prohibited action.  See, e.g., Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 23. Krieger, supra note 13, at 1168. 
 24. Id. at 1169. 
 25. Id.
 26. Title VII, the ADEA and the FHA have been interpreted to reach facially 
neutral practices with a disproportionate impact.  See supra note 9 and accompanying 
text.  This theory of liability under Title VII was approved by the Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); subsequently, Griggs was limited by Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which was modified later by a 
1991 amendment, found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i), designed to return the 
law to its pre-Wards Cove status.  However, that amendment did not include the 
ADEA or the FHA.
 27. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976); see also Personnel 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (the challenged decision must be 
made “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group”). 
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tion:  the direct method and the indirect method,28 with a mixed-motive de-
fense available in some cases. 
A.  Indirect Method 
The indirect method, referred to as the McDonnell-Douglas proof 
scheme, and used most often in employment discrimination cases, establishes 
a three-step burden-shifting framework.  First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case.29  For example, an applicant for a position claiming her 
application was rejected because of sex can establish a prima facie case by 
showing (i) she is a member of a protected group, (ii) applied for an open 
position, (iii) she was qualified for the position, and (iv) her application was 
rejected and the employer hired a male, or the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applications from persons with qualifications 
similar to the plaintiff’s.  This creates a presumption of discrimination.30
Second, the burden of production31 then shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action.32  Third, 
assuming the employer meets this minimal burden, the plaintiff, who retains 
the ultimate burden of persuasion, can establish intentional discrimination 
either directly by showing “that a discriminatory reason more likely moti-
vated the employer or indirectly by showing that the proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence [pret 33ext].”
 28. The indirect method was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).  The difficulty in proving intentional discrimination was 
recognized by the Court and served as the impetus for establishing the indirect me-
thod. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 
(1983); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (“the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to com-
pensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come 
by”). 
 29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  There are many formulations of this 
standard, which is adapted to address different types of discrimination and different 
types of adverse actions.  Id. at n.13. 
 30. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (the 
effect of the presumption is to force the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory 
explanation because silence in the face of the presumption results in judgment for the 
plaintiff).  The prima facie case serves an important function in that “it eliminates the 
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”  Id. at 253-54. 
 31. The burden of proof has two aspects: burden of production, which identifies 
the party with the obligation to go forward with the evidence and the amount of evi-
dence needed to survive, and burden of persuasion, which identifies the party that 
runs the risk of losing if it does not convince the trier of fact.  Id. at 252-56.
 32. Id. at 254-55 (“the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction 
of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection”). 
 33. Id. at 256.  Since establishing a prima facie case was not intended to be par-
ticularly difficult, and articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is even less 
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The McDonnell-Douglas proof scheme, including the presumption it 
creates, represents a recognition that “the question facing triers of fact in dis-
crimination cases is both sensitive and difficult,” and that “[t]here will seldom 
be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”34  How-
ever, after each side meets its initial burden “the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work – with its presumptions and burdens” – disappears and the sole remain-
ing issue is “discrimination vel non.”35  Thus, proving intentional discrimina-
tion remains difficult because it is easy for defendants to articulate a nondis-
criminatory reason(s) for the challenged decision.  
For a variety of reasons, the indirect method provides plaintiffs with lit-
tle assistance in proving disparate treatment.  First, some circuits have modi-
fied the prima facie case requirements articulated by the Court in McDonnell-
Douglas, particularly the fourth factor.36  For example, instead of requiring a 
plaintiff claiming sex discrimination in an employer’s rejection of her appli-
cation to show that “after [her] rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifi-
cations,”37 some circuits either require a showing that she “was treated less 
favorably than similarly situated individuals outside of [her] protected class,” 
or treat such a showing as an alternative way of satisfying the fourth factor.38
difficult, at the summary judgment stage cases often turn on the pretext issue.  In 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000), the Court 
confirmed that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to 
find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to 
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”  This was initially decided in 
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), but the Court revisited the 
issue in Reeves because some circuits ignored Hicks and determined that “a plaintiff 
must always present additional, independent evidence of discrimination.”  Reeves,
530 U.S. at 146, 149. 
 34. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
 35. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, and Aikens, 460 
U.S. at 714).  While the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case disap-
pears when the employer satisfies its burden of production, “[t]he trier of fact may 
still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case ‘and inferences 
properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is 
pretextual.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). 
 36. See Pantoja v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., 495 F.3d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir. 
2007) (noting “that there has been a subtle evolution in the way that courts described 
the McDonnell Douglas requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination, at least 
when the adverse action at issue is the employee’s termination”). 
 37. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 38. Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., Dist. U-46, 462 F.3d 762, 772 (7th Cir. 2006); 
see also Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel.
Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 
F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2002); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2000).
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By requiring a plaintiff to show she “was treated less favorably than similarly 
situated individuals outside of [her] protected class,” a court is effectively 
requiring her to prove intentional discrimination by direct evidence as part of 
the prima facie case.39   Requiring the plaintiff to show that a similarly situ-
ated person outside the protected class was treated more favorably is particu-
larly burdensome because “similarly situated” means nearly identical.40
Second, the defendant’s burden of production in the second stage of the 
indirect method is a very minimal burden because all the defendant has to do 
to avoid the presumption created by the prima facie case is articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged action.41  This leaves the plaintiff 
with the burden of persuasion to show intentional discrimination, without the 
benefit of a presumption, by showing either that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or that the articulated reason is not the true 
reason, but rather a pretext for intentional discrimination.42  While in theory, 
the force of the prima facie case, combined with a showing that the articu-
lated reason is not the real reason for the challenged decision, is sufficient for 
a finding of intentional discrimination, there are still circuits that are reluctant 
to follow the Court’s holding.43
 39. This is true because a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from such 
evidence alone.  See, e.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2000) (proof that the plaintiff was treated less favorably than a similarly situated 
person outside the protected group raises an inference of discrimination). 
 40. See, e.g., Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007) (the 
purpose of the “‘similarly situated’ test . . . is to determine whether there are enough 
common factors between a plaintiff and a comparator – and few enough confounding 
ones – to allow for a meaningful comparison in order to divine whether discrimination 
was at play”); Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[a]n 
employee is similarly situated to a plaintiff if the two employees deal with the same 
supervisor, are subject to the same standards, and have engaged in similar conduct 
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their 
conduct or the employer’s treatment of them”); Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
463 F.3d 731, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2000) (the other(s) must be “directly comparable in all 
material respects,” including 1) the same job descriptions, 2) the same standards, 3) 
the same supervisor, and 4) comparable experience, education and other qualifica-
tions – provided these latter factors were considered in making the challenged deci-
sion); Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 774 (quoting Brummett v. Sinclair Broad. Group, 
Inc., 414 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2005)) (to be “similarly situated” to the plaintiff a 
person “must be ‘directly comparable in all material respects,’” taking into account all 
of the relevant factors).
 41. In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court said the 
“burden that shifts to the defendant . . . is to rebut the presumption of discrimination 
by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, 
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  The defendant need not persuade the court 
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.”  450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
 42. See id. at 255-56. 
 43. See, e.g., Young v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250-52 (10th Cir. 
2006); Ronda-Perez v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria-Puerto Rico, 404 F.3d 42, 
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Finally, at the third stage of the indirect method the lower courts con-
tinue to inappropriately discount comments when ruling on summary judg-
ment, despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., where it stated that the court of appeals “failed to draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of [the plaintiff].  For instance, while acknowl-
edging ‘the potentially damning nature’ of Chestnut’s age-related comments, 
the [lower] court discounted them on the ground that they ‘were not made in 
the direct context of Reeves’s termination.’”44  This suggests comments 
should not be discounted simply because they were not made in the “direct 
context” of the challenged decision.  Nevertheless, lower courts continue to 
do just that.45  In contrast, other lower court decisions hold that such com-
ments, at least where there is temporal proximity, create an issue of material 
fact.46
B.  Direct Method 
Courts frequently say that discrimination claims may be established by 
utilizing either the indirect method, described above, or the direct method.47
Under the latter method, “the plaintiff must show either through direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the employer’s decision to take the adverse job 
action was motivated by an impermissible purpose, such as her race or na-
tional origin.”48  Thus, “direct method” describes the usual or conventional 
way of proving a case without the benefit of the presumption available under 
the indirect method.  Despite the difficulty in succeeding under the indirect 
method, plaintiffs pursuing discrimination cases tend to rely on this method 
instead of the direct method.  There are several possible explanations for this, 
including a misperception that the indirect method is plaintiff-friendly be-
44-48 (1st Cir. 2005); Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 725-31 (6th Cir. 
2004); Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 214-15 (4th Cir. 2004); Girten v. McRen-
tals, Inc., 337 F.3d 979, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 44. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 152 (2000). 
 45. See, e.g., Ramlet v. E.F. Johnson Co., 507 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (8th Cir. 
2007); Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523-28 (6th Cir. 2007); Ramirez 
Rodriguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 78-84 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548-51 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 46. See, e.g., Volovsek v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 344 
F.3d 680, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff overheard her supervisors speaking about 
“keeping them barefoot and pregnant” shortly before she was denied a promotion and 
because of the temporal proximity this gender-related comment created an issue of 
material fact). 
 47. See, e.g., Adams v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 938-39 (7th Cir. 
2003).
 48. Id.
49
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cause of the presumption.49  Further, some courts take a narrow view of what 
type of evidence may be used under the direct method, limiting the plaintiff to 
direct evidence.50   While it may be appropriate to distinguish direct evidence 
from circumstantial evidence,51 the confusion arises when the direct method 
of proving disparate treatment, is interpreted to exclude circumstantial evi-
dence.52 Cases recognize that circumstantial evidence may be “more certain, 
satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”53  The Court, in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,54 explicitly 
 49. In addition, the courts may have promoted the use of the indirect method.  
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278-79 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).
 50. Usually direct evidence does not include circumstantial evidence.  Obviously 
comments like “I won’t hire you because you’re a woman” or “I’m firing you because 
you’re not a Christian” constitute direct proof of discrimination, but direct method 
evidence should include “remarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the 
decisionmaker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria . . . even if the evidence 
stops short of a virtual admission of illegality.”  Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 
956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997).  Some courts are inclined to either exclude or discount 
comments of the latter type. 
 51. For example, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the issue was “whether a plain-
tiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive 
instruction under Title VII.”  539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).  The Court concluded that direct 
evidence of discrimination is not required, meaning that circumstantial evidence alone 
could satisfy the plaintiff’s burden.  Id. at 101-02.  The point is that circumstantial 
evidence was viewed differently than direct evidence.  But see Sylvester v. SOS Chil-
dren’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006) (the “distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence is vague”). 
 52. Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir. 
2006); see also Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645, 650-52 (7th Cir. 2007) (discuss-
ing confusing terminology – “direct method” and “direct evidence” – and noting that 
“[e]vidence used in the direct method is ‘not limited to near-admissions by the em-
ployer’”); Hossack v. Floor Covering Assocs. of Joliet, Inc., 492 F.3d 853, 861-62 
(7th Cir. 2007) (under the direct method we now allow circumstantial evidence to be 
introduced); Luks v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(direct proof of discrimination is not limited to “near-admissions,” but includes cir-
cumstantial evidence that “suggests discrimination albeit through a longer chain of 
inferences”); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2006) (direct 
evidence includes an “outright admission” of discrimination as well as circumstantial 
evidence that points directly to a discriminatory reason for the challenged decision). 
 53. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Rog-
ers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)); see also Sylvester, 453 F.3d 
at 903 (while on average circumstantial evidence may require a “longer chain of in-
ferences, . . . if each link is solid, the evidence may be compelling – may be more 
compelling than eyewitness testimony, which depends for its accuracy on the accu-
racy of the eyewitness’s recollection as well as on his honesty”). 
 54. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  In this case, the plaintiffs alleged race discrimination 
in the denial of a rezoning request that would have allowed construction of townhouse 
units for low- and moderate-income tenants.  Id. at 254. 
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approved the use of circumstantial evidence under the direct method of prov-
ing intentional discrimination, including: 
a) statistical evidence of a clearly discriminatory impact,  
b) the historical background of the challenged decision, including 
the sequence of events leading to it, and  
c) the legislative or administrative history of a law or decision.55
However, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs “simply failed to carry 
their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in 
the [challenged] decision.”56  Even if the plaintiffs had established that a dis-
criminatory purpose was a motivating factor this would not have required 
invalidation of the challenged decision.  Rather, “[s]uch proof would have 
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would 
have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”57
In another case, Castaneda v. Partida,58 the Court held that the stark 
statistical disparity showing a substantial underrepresentation of a particular 
group establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, particularly 
where the selection process at issue is highly subjective.59  The statistical 
disparity, showing a 40% difference between Mexican-Americans in the rele-
vant population and Mexican-Americans summoned for grand jury service, 
established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and “shifted the 
burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimina-
tion.”60  Because the State failed to rebut this inference, the Court affirmed 
the lower court’s finding of a violation of equal protection in the grand jury 
selection process.61  Both cases, Village of Arlington Heights and Castaneda,
 55. Id. at 266-68. 
 56. Id. at 270. 
 57. Id. at 271 n.21.  If the Village satisfied its burden, the injury complained of 
by the plaintiffs could no longer be attributed to the “improper consideration of a 
discriminatory purpose” and there would be no justification for judicial interference 
with the challenged decision.  Id.  Note how this differs from the mixed-motive cases, 
based on Title VII, where establishing that the same decision would have been 
reached absent the improper motive, affects the remedy but not liability.  See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 58. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).  This case challenged the selection of members of the 
grand jury, alleging discrimination against Mexican-Americans.  Id. at 483.  Statistics 
showed that even though the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, 
over an eleven-year period only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service 
were Mexican-American.  Id. at 486-87. 
 59. Id. at 494-98.   
 60. Id. at 495-98. 
 61. Id. at 501.  The method of proof in Castaneda, where the circumstantial 
evidence permitted an inference of discrimination, should not be confused with the 
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approve the use of circumstantial evidence when proceeding under the direct 
method.  This is consistent with Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Illinois,
where the court clarifies that circumstantial evidence may be utilized by a 
plaintiff proceeding under the direct method of proof.62
C.  Mixed-Motive Defense 
Recognizing that a decision can be motivated by more than one factor, 
the Court in Village of Arlington Heights determined that the plaintiff need 
only show that “discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor,” not the sole 
factor.63  If a plaintiff utilizing the direct method of proof provides evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that a prohibited factor was a motivating factor 
in the challenged decision, this shifts the burden to the defendant to establish 
“that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible pur-
pose not been considered.”64  This approach was utilized in a freedom of 
speech case, decided the same day as Village of Arlington Heights, brought 
by a government employee claiming retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment,65 and in a subsequent Title VII case alleging sex discrimination 
by an accounting firm, where the Court referred to it as a the mixed-motive 
defense.66  In short, this defense recognizes that a decisionmaker may be mo-
tivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors in making a challenged 
decision.   
Applying the mixed-motive defense, the Court in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins held  
that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender 
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant 
may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponder-
indirect method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas, discussed above, where 
the proof of certain elements triggers a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. 
 62. Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir. 
2006). But see Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2007) (defin-
ing direct evidence as evidence that proves a fact without requiring an inference and 
referring to circumstantial evidence as indirect evidence). 
 63. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 
(1977).
 64. Id. at 271 n.21. 
 65. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
(the school district had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it would have made the same decision even absent any protected conduct).   
 66. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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ance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision 
even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.67
A few years later, in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to recognize the 
mixed-motive theory, but made it only a limited affirmative defense.  Based 
on the statutory mixed-motive defense, if an employer satisfies its burden by 
showing it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the imper-
missible motivating factor,” this showing restricts the remedy, but the em-
ployer does not escape liability.68  This means an applicant who proves that 
her gender was a motivating factor in the decision to reject her application is 
not entitled to an injunction requiring that she be hired, with lost wages, if the 
employer proves it would have rejected the application even if it had not con-
sidered gender.  However, she may obtain declaratory relief, injunctive relief, 
costs and attorney fees.69
Addressing the statutory mixed-motive defense in Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, the Court held that a plaintiff could satisfy her burden to show that an 
impermissible factor such as sex was a motivating factor for the challenged 
decision70 through circumstantial evidence, without any direct evidence.71
This decision clarified that a plaintiff can shift the burden of establishing the 
mixed-motive defense to the defendant even when proceeding under the indi-
rect method without direct evidence.  
The role of the mixed-motive theory beyond Title VII cases is less than 
clear.  Two decisions, Mt. Healthy City School District and Village of Arling-
ton Heights, suggest the Price Waterhouse version of the theory which en-
ables the defendant to escape liability, applies to cases not based on Title VII.  
However, a key component of the theory, i.e., that a defendant who meets its 
burden by showing it would have made the same decision absent the imper-
missible factor only limits the remedy, is based on a 1991 amendment to Title 
VII.72  Therefore, while some circuits have considered the mixed-motive 
theory in ADEA cases since the 1991 amendment,73 the application of this 
 67. Id. at 258.  Similarly, the Court in Mt. Healthy City School District, held that 
the employer could avoid First Amendment liability by proving that it would have 
taken the challenged action “even in the absence of the protected conduct.”  429 U.S. 
at 287. 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 69. Id.
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 71. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003). 
 72. Since the ADA incorporates the Title VII enforcement provisions, including 
§ 2000e-5, the “full” mixed-motive theory should apply in ADA cases.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12117. 
 73. See, e.g., Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520-21 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(applying the mixed-motive theory, but concluding the plaintiff did not provide suffi-
cient direct or circumstantial evidence to satisfy his burden); Baqir v. Principi, 434 
F.3d 733, 744-45 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying the mixed-motive theory and concluding 
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theory in such cases may be different than in cases based on Title VII, after it 
was amended in 1991.74
D.  Comments as Evidence of Discrimination 
Proving intentional discrimination is difficult, at least in part because 
decisionmakers have become quite sophisticated in masking their discrimina-
tory intent.  To unmask this intent, plaintiffs in discrimination cases fre-
quently seek to present, either as evidence of illegal discrimination under the 
direct method or as evidence of pretext under the indirect method, comments 
made by people associated with the defendant.  Such comments present a 
number of issues, including admissibility, weight, i.e., their role in surviving 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence, and selection of the 
appropriate proof scheme.   
While admissibility may be challenged based on relevancy and hearsay, 
neither challenge presents a substantial barrier.  Assuming derogatory com-
ments are admissible,75 an equally important question is whether the com-
ments constitute sufficient evidence of discrimination to allow the plaintiff to 
survive the defendant’s motion for either summary judgment76 or for judg-
ment as a matter of law.77  In considering such a motion, the court should 
review all of the evidence in the record, but “draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations 
or weigh the evidence.”78  Further, it is the function of the jury, not the judge, 
to draw “legitimate inferences from the facts,” and the court “must disregard 
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to be-
lieve.”79  Applying this standard in Reeves, the Court held that the Court of 
Appeals erred in overturning the jury verdict because, while acknowledging 
the plaintiff satisfied his burden based on evidence of comments, but the defendant 
avoided liability by showing it would have taken the same action even in the absence 
of the discriminatory motive; the court noted that the 1991 amendment to Title VII 
does not affect the ADEA and, therefore, the defendant avoids ADEA liability when it 
meets its burden); Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352-55 (5th Cir. 
2005) (describing the court’s “integrated” or “modified” McDonnell Douglas ap-
proach where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence and the mixed-motive the-
ory and suggesting the defendant avoids liability if it meets its burden).  
74. See, e.g., Baqir, 434 F.3d at 744-45 (1991 amendment to Title VII does not 
affect the ADEA). 
 75. The Federal Rules of Evidence and their applicability to this issue will be 
discussed below in Part IV.B. 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 77. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
 78. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).  
While the Court in Reeves was addressing a Federal Rule of Evidence 50(a) motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, it noted that the standard for granting summary 
judgment “mirrors” the standard for judgment as a matter of law.  Id.
 79. Id. at 151. 
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“the potentially damning nature” of the decisionmaker’s age-related com-
ments, it improperly discounted them because they “were not made in the 
direct context of Reeves’ termination.”80
Reeves, like many other discrimination cases, was litigated under the 
McDonnell-Douglas indirect proof scheme.  As discussed above, if the plain-
tiff utilizing this scheme presents sufficient evidence to establish a prima 
facie case,81 the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged decision.  Assuming 
the defendant meets this minimal burden, the real issue becomes whether the 
plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or the reason(s) 
articulated by the defendant is a pretext for discrimination.82  the Reeves
Court confirmed83 that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with suffi-
cient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may 
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discrimi-
nated.”84  Whether this conclusion is appropriate in a particular case “will 
depend on a number of factors,” including the “strength of the plaintiff’s pri-
ma facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explana-
tion is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and 
that may properly may be considered on a motion for [summary judg-
ment].”85  The employer in Reeves was not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
 80. Id. at 152. 
 81. It is not unusual, at this stage, for the court to express concern about whether 
the plaintiff has satisfied one or more of the prongs of a prima facie case, but assume 
that she has and then go on to address whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient 
evidence of pretext. 
 82. Cases hold that the plaintiff can establish pretext indirectly by showing the 
employer’s reason for the challenged action has no basis in fact, the reason given was 
not the real reason, or the reason given was not sufficient to warrant the challenged 
action. See, e.g., Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1994).  
Cases are split on whether a plaintiff must present facts to rebut each nondiscrimina-
tory reason advanced by the defendant.  Compare Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 
1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff must rebut each reason), with Strate v. Midwest 
Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Davenport v. River-
view Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 945 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1994)) (rejecting Clay and 
holding the plaintiff need only “‘raise a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the 
defendant’s motive’”).  A proper understanding of McDonnell-Douglas argues in 
favor of the Eighth Circuit approach because a finding that one reason is a lie allows 
an inference that it was advanced by the defendant to hide discrimination. 
 83. Because some circuits were ignoring the holding in St. Mary’s Honor Center 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), the Court decided to address it again. 
 84. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.  This is consistent with the “general principle of 
evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a 
material fact as ‘affirmative evidence of guilt.’”  Id. at 147 (quoting Wright v. West, 
505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)). 
 85. Id. at 148-49. 
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law because Reeves, in addition to establishing a prima facie case of dis-
crimination and creating a jury issue on the falsity of the employer’s articu-
lated reason for the challenged decision,86 introduced “other evidence” that 
the decision was motivated by age-based animus.  This “other evidence” was 
the age-related comments of the decisionmaker.87 Reeves was an easy case 
because the plaintiff (a) established a prima facie case, (b) presented suffi-
cient evidence of the falsity of the employer’s articulated reason for the chal-
lenged decision to create a jury issue, and (c) presented additional evidence - 
the comments - of an age-based animus.   
At least two questions remain after Reeves: first, when will the plaintiff 
be required to present evidence beyond the first two categories – a prima 
facie case and evidence of pretext; and second, will comments indicative of a 
discriminatory animus alone be sufficient to create a jury question on the 
pretext issue.88  As to the former, Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, 
stated:
I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the Court, in 
an appropriate case, to define more precisely the circumstances in 
which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence beyond these 
two categories in order to survive a motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law.  I anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon.  
As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is 
entitled to treat a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as evi-
dence of culpability.89
Therefore, according to Justice Ginsburg, the combination of the first two 
categories of evidence should usually be sufficient to create a jury question 
on the ultimate issue - intent to discriminate. 
 86. The employer met its burden “by offering admissible evidence sufficient for 
the trier of fact to conclude that [Reeves] was fired because of his failure to maintain 
accurate attendance records.”  Id. at 142.  Reeves then “made a substantial showing 
that [the employer’s] explanation was false.”  Id. at 144.  This included evidence (i) 
that he properly maintained the attendance records, (ii) casting doubt on whether he 
was responsible for any failure to discipline late and absent workers, (iii) that there 
had never been a union grievance or employee complaint arising from Reeves’ re-
cordkeeping and the employer had never calculated the amount of overpayments 
allegedly due to Reeves’ errors, and (iv) on other occasions when employees were 
paid for hours they had not worked, the employer simply adjusted their next paycheck 
to correct the errors. Id. at 144-45. 
 87. The court of appeals had improperly discounted the comments because they 
“‘were not made in the direct context of Reeves’s termination.’”  Id.  at 152 (quoting 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 88. For example, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and presents evi-
dence of comments, but presents no evidence directly undermining the employer’s 
articulated reason(s) for the challenged decision. 
 89. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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With the exception of a few ADEA cases, the courts generally look for 
discrimination at the point of decision, asking whether a decisionmaker de-
cided to treat a person adversely because of her or his protected status.  As 
stated by the plurality in Price Waterhouse,
[i]n saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of 
the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful re-
sponse, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or em-
ployee was a woman.90
In other words, the decisionmaker consciously decided to base the decision, 
at least in part, on the applicant’s or the employee’s protected status.  While 
such blatant discrimination still takes place, it does not constitute the universe 
of discrimination nor, in all likelihood, even the majority of discrimination.  
Recent psychological research demonstrates that limiting unlawful discrimi-
nation to the “old-fashioned” type ignores how discrimination actually works 
in many situations and leaves much discrimination untouched.     
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ENHANCES OUR UNDERSTANDING 
OF BIAS
In addressing evidentiary and proof issues familiar to lawyers, such as 
admissibility, weight and sufficiency of proof, it is helpful to understand what 
psychologists have discovered about the nature of bias and discrimination.  
While most reported decisions addressing proof of discrimination do not ad-
dress theories of human behavior, at least not explicitly,91 both psychologists 
and law professors have written quite extensively on behavioral theories and 
how such theories can assist lawyers, judges and jurors in understanding dis-
 90. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
 91. An exception is found in Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, where he discusses the expert testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske indicat-
ing “that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced 
by sex stereotyping.”  Id. at 235.  Justice Brennan refers to Dr. Fiske’s testimony 
again, indicating she found sex stereotyping in some of the partners’ comments and in 
their evaluations of Ms. Hopkins.  Id. at 255.  Justice O’Connor, in her concurring 
opinion, also refers to Dr. Fiske’s testimony, indicating that her testimony “standing 
alone, would not justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer.”  Id. at 277 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257, 
1262-65 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (denying defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of 
Dr. Fiske); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-05 
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (relying on Dr. Fiske’s testimony on the subject of sexual stereotyp-
ing).
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crimination.92  Much can be learned about the nature of discrimination from 
these scholarly publications.  In an article published in 1995, Professor 
Krieger says “[t]he emergence of social cognition theory represented a pro-
found shift in psychologists’ thinking about intergroup bias.”93  A “central 
premise of social cognition theory,” according to Professor Krieger, is “that 
cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and information 
processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other forms of 
biased intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational proc-
esses.”94  Several aspects of the social cognition approach to discrimination 
are relevant here.  First, stereotyping is a form of categorization used “to sim-
plify the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about peo-
ple in memory.”95  This is a cognitive mechanism used by all people, not just 
those who are prejudiced.96  Second, “once in place, stereotypes bias inter-
group judgment and decisionmaking” and “they function as implicit theories, 
biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, 
and recall of information about other people.”97  Since the biases are “cogni-
tive rather than motivational,” they “operate absent intent to favor or disfavor 
members of a particular social group.”98  Most importantly, “they bias a deci-
sionmaker’s judgment long before the ‘moment of decision,’ as a decision-
maker attends to relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it 
from memory.”99  Third, “[s]tereotypes, when they function as implicit proto-
types or schemas, operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness” 
and, therefore, “cognitive bias may well be both unintentional and uncon-
scious.”100  Congress recognized this when considering legislation aimed at 
 92. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward 
a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 
(2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit 
Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Krieger, supra note 13, at 1168; Krieger & Fiske, 
supra note 13.  Many more articles are cited in the articles listed here. 
 93. Krieger, supra note 13, at 1187.
 94. Id.
 95. Id. at 1188. See also Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502 (“The study of stereo-
typing is the study of category-based responses in the human thought and perceptual 
processes.  Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are three basic kinds of cate-
gory-based responses.  Stereotyping exists primarily as a thought process, prejudice 
develops as an emotional or an evaluative process, primarily negative in nature, while 
discrimination manifests itself as a behavioral response.  Discrimination in this con-
text is defined by the treatment of a person differently and less favorably because of 
the category to which that person belongs.  Either stereotyping or prejudice may form 
the basis for discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 
 96. Id.
 97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. Id.
 100. Id.; see also generally Hart, supra note 92.
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disability discrimination.101  It also recognized that “much of the conduct that 
[it] sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not 
impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled 
by a discriminatory intent.”102
Contemporary racial bias has been described as “aversive racism,” 
meaning it is racism that is “more indirect and subtle than the traditional form 
of prejudice, but its consequences are no less evil.”103    An important aspect 
of this framework is the conflict between “the denial of personal prejudice 
and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and beliefs.”104  While 
“most whites hold strong convictions concerning fairness, justice, and racial 
equality, . . . [they] also develop some negative feelings toward, or beliefs 
about, blacks.”105  These negative feelings and beliefs, or biases, “may occur 
spontaneously, automatically, and without full awareness.”106  Because of the 
“conflict between the denial of personal prejudice and the underlying uncon-
scious negative feelings and beliefs,” aversive racists “will not discriminate in 
situations in which discrimination would be obvious to others and to them-
selves.”107  Therefore, aversive racists will not discriminate when “the appro-
priate decision is obvious,” such as where a candidate for a position is clearly 
qualified or not qualified; however, where the appropriate decision is not 
clear “because of ambiguous evidence about whether the candidate’s qualifi-
cations meet the criteria for selection or when the candidate’s file has con-
flicting information,” bias is expected.108  In the latter situation, “the aversive 
 101. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-97 (1985) (“Discrimination 
against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not 
of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference – of benign ne-
glect.”); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993) (quoting 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)) (characterizing employer decisions as 
“based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by objective fact”); Thomas v. East-
man Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58-60 (1st Cir. 1999) (the “ultimate question is whether 
an employee has been treated disparately ‘because of race,’” and this “is so regardless 
of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or 
simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias”). 
 102. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 296-97.
 103. John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Jason A. Nier, Kerry Kawakami & 
Gordon Hodson, Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People do Bad Things, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 141, 143 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).  
Aversive racism “is hypothesized to be qualitatively different from the old-fashioned, 
blatant kind, and it is presumed to characterize the racial attitudes of most well-
educated and liberal whites in the United States.”  Id.
 104. Id. at 143-44. 
 105. Id. at 144. 
 106. Id.
 107. Id. at 143-45. 
 108. Id. at 148. 
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racist can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor 
other than race.”109
A related theory, referred to as “implicit bias,” is also relevant.  Implicit 
bias recognizes that “[m]any mental processes function implicitly, or outside 
conscious attentional focus,” including attitudes and stereotypes.110  An atti-
tude is an “evaluative disposition,” such as a “tendency to like or dislike,” 
and one’s implicit attitudes may differ from “explicit attitudes” toward the 
same subject.111  “A social stereotype is a mental association between a social 
group or category and a trait,” and the association may or may not “reflect a 
statistical reality,” and it may involve either “favorable or unfavorable 
traits.”112  A recently developed test, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), that 
requires those taking it to categorize a series of words or pictures into groups, 
can “measure a wide variety of the group-valence and group-trait associations 
that underlie attitudes and stereotypes.”113  The results of the IAT suggest 
implicit bias is quite pervasive.114  Jolls and Sunstein say “implicit bias – like 
many of the heuristics and biases emphasized elsewhere – tends to have an 
automatic character, in a way that bears importantly on its relationship to 
legal prohibitions.”115  Because implicit bias is largely automatic, “people are 
often surprised to find that they show the implicit bias.”116
The “science of implicit cognition” indicates that people do not always 
have “conscious, intentional control over the processes of social perception, 
impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.”117  This 
leads to reasonable questions about the “effectiveness of antidiscrimination 
laws insofar as they are interpreted to require a showing of intentional dis-
crimination at the time of the challenged decision.”118  However, this article 
is more limited in scope.  It assumes plaintiffs must establish intentional dis-
crimination in order to prevail in most cases based on the antidiscrimination 
 109. Id. at 145. 
 110. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 947-48 (2006). 
 111. Id. at 948-49 (such “dissociations” are “commonly observed in attitudes 
toward stigmatized groups”). 
 112. Id. at 949-50. 
 113. Id. at 952-58 (describing the test in detail); see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra 
note 92, at 971.  For several versions of the IAT, see Project Implicit, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu (last visited February 19, 2008). 
 114. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 110, at 955-59; see also Jolls & Sunstein, 
supra note 92, at 971-72 (“implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be 
extremely widespread”). 
 115. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 92, at 973. 
 116. Id. at 975. 
 117. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 110, at 946. 
 118. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 13, at 1186-1242; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 
13, at 1027-52 (2006); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 92; Hart, supra note 92, at 745-
66.
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statutes, as well as the Constitution, but suggests ways of satisfying the intent 
requirement in light of the fact that much discrimination may be unconscious 
at the point of decision.  Application of the social cognition theory confirms 
that stereotyping can be evidence of discrimination, but to the extent that 
stereotyping operates unconsciously, it takes further explanation to show how 
it is evidence of intentional discrimination. 
If proof of intent is necessary to prevail in disparate treatment cases, it is 
important for the courts to determine whether decisions that result from un-
conscious stereotyping are insulated from attack.  Others have discussed how 
stereotypes cause discrimination.  Social cognition theory views stereotypes  
as social schemas or person prototypes.  They operate as implicit 
expectancies that influence how incoming information is inter-
preted, the causes to which events are attributed, and how events 
are encoded into, retained in, and retrieved from memory.  In other 
words, stereotypes cause discrimination by biasing how we process 
information about other people.119
Professor Krieger outlines the process in greater detail120 and explains why 
“it becomes clear that stereotypes, person prototypes, and other implicit 
knowledge structures bias decisionmaking long before the ‘moment of deci-
sion’ upon which [cases] focus Title VII’s adjudicative attention.”121  In other 
words, “[c]ognitive sources of intergroup bias corrupt decisionmaking not at 
the moment of decision, but long before it, by distorting the interpretive 
framework through which decisions are made.  Social cognition theory teach-
es us that interpersonal decisionmaking is an integrated system comprising 
perception, interpretation, attribution, memory, and judgment.”122
If the antidiscrimination statute relied upon is interpreted to require 
proof of intentional discrimination and the stereotyping that causes the dis-
crimination is unconscious, can the plaintiff prevail?  Dr. Fiske, an expert 
witness in Price Waterhouse, describes what she calls a nightmare: 
After testifying for the plaintiff in a case of egregious and demon-
strable discrimination, a cognitive social psychologist faces the 
cross-examining attorney.  The hostile attorney, who looms taller 
than Goliath, says, “Tell us, Professor, do people intend to dis-
criminate?”  The cognitive social psychologist hedges about not 
having any hard data with regard to discrimination, being an expert 
mainly in stereotyping.  When pressed, the psychologist admits 
that stereotypic cognitions are presumed to underlie discriminatory 
 119. Krieger, supra note 13, at 1199. 
 120. Id. at 1199-1211. 
 121. Id. at 1209. 
 122. Id. at 1213. 
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behavior.  Pressed still further, the psychologist reluctantly mum-
bles that, indeed, a common interpretation of the cognitive ap-
proach is that people do not stereotype intentionally, whereupon 
the cross-examining attorney says in a tone of triumph, “No further 
questions, Your Honor.”  The plaintiff is led shaking from the 
courtroom, and the psychologist is left stewing about the misuse of 
science outside the ivory tower.123
To address her nightmare, Dr. Fiske identified three features of intent: 
(a) it exists “when a person has options – that is, a perceived choice among 
cognitively available alternatives;” (b) it “typically entails a choice between a 
more dominant alternative and a weaker alternative” and it is “especially ob-
vious when one makes the hard choice, by pursuing the nondominant alterna-
tive – that is, doing what one would not otherwise do;” and (c) it is “mediated 
by motivated attention,” i.e., the “alternatives on which a person emphatically 
concentrates the mind determines what the person intends.”124  After examin-
ing these features in greater detail, Dr. Fiske provides the answer for the 
cross-examining attorney in her nightmare. 
The cognitive social psychologist could now reply that people 
probably can help it when they stereotype and prejudge.  The idea 
that categorization is a natural and adaptive, even dominant, way 
of understanding other people does not mean that it is the only op-
tion available.  Perceivers make the hard choice to individuate un-
der a variety of circumstances.  Because perceivers have options 
available, they may be said to intend the one they choose.  If peo-
ple stereotype and prejudge, reckless or careless of the conse-
quences, they may be said to do so intentionally.125
In a later article, Dr. Fiske discussed the role of motivation in encourag-
ing decisionmakers to be accurate in their assessment of people, i.e., make 
individual rather than stereotypical judgments based on group membership.126
While “categorization and stereotypic associations are relatively automatic,” 
these “processes are less automatic than we psychologists all thought,” and a 
“variety of motivations can intervene at surprisingly early stages in the proc-
ess.”127  Dr. Fiske identifies five “motives that matter” – belonging, shared 
social understanding, mutual social controlling, enhancing the self, and need 
for trusting others – all of which are “rooted in people’s adaptation to survive 
 123. Fiske, supra note 18, at 253-54. 
 124. Id. at 256. 
 125. Id. at 277 (citations omitted). 
 126. Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social 
Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 118 (2004). 
 127. Id. at 122. 
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in social groups.”128  Each of these motives “demonstrably affects prejudice 
and discrimination.”129  She concludes by saying: 
The practical lessons from the research on intent and ordinary bias 
are that policymakers and managers need to facilitate both infor-
mation and motivation, to encourage decision-makers’ least biased 
evaluations of other people.  Information has to be accurate, rele-
vant, and unambiguous.  For example, adequate, relevant informa-
tion about the qualifications of a new employee from an underrep-
resented group can override assumptions that the person is an al-
legedly unqualified affirmative action hire. 
In addition, motivations have to encourage people to be accurate.  
Organizations can facilitate decision-makers’ thoughtful reasoning 
about others by the values that supervisors communicate, account-
ability to those supervisors, organizational structures that stress 
teamwork, and encouraging people’s better selves.  Accountability 
and interdependence rely on the bald use of incentives.  Organiza-
tional and individual values rely on more subtle but equally im-
pactful guides to behavior.130
Stereotypes thrive in situations where decisionmakers have unbridled 
discretion to make subjective employment decisions.  According to the plain-
tiffs in cases like Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,131 this leads to gender-
biased discrimination in, for example, compensation and promotions.  One of 
the plaintiffs’ experts in Dukes submitted a report explaining how 
“[c]entralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, 
creates and sustains uniformity in personnel policy and practice throughout 
the organizational units of Wal-Mart,” while the “[s]ubjective and discretion-
ary features of the company’s personnel policy and practice make decisions 
about compensation and promotion vulnerable to gender bias.”132  He con-
cluded that “gender bias in the workplace is by no means inevitable, and so-
cial science research shows what kinds of policies and practices effectively 
 128. Id. at 123-24.   
 129. Id. at 124. 
 130. Id. at 125. 
 131. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (certifying a plaintiff class).  
 132. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Class Certification at ¶10, Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 (No. C-01-2252-MJJ), 2003 WL 
24571701.  Dr. Bielby describes the situation at Wal-Mart in great detail, discussing 
the uniformity in personnel policies and discretion in compensation and promotions.  
Id. ¶¶ 11-21, 37-41. 
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minimize bias.”133  Employers have the option of taking steps to minimize the 
bias.
Through deliberate efforts, the effects of stereotypes can be con-
trolled.  Research studies show that the effects of stereotypes and 
out-group bias on evaluative judgments such as those involved in 
recruitment, hiring, hob assignment, promotion, and assessments of 
skills and qualifications can be minimized when decision-makers 
know that they will be held accountable for the criteria used to 
make decisions, for the accuracy of the information upon which 
they decisions are based, and for the consequences their actions 
have for equal employment opportunity.  However, . . . at Wal-
Mart, personnel decisions regarding promotion and hourly com-
pensation rely significantly on discretionary and subjective criteria, 
with little monitoring and oversight.134
More specifically, Dr. Bielby said true equal employment opportunity ac-
countability has three key elements:  “(1) monitoring and analysis of dispari-
ties in career trajectories; (2) systematic evaluation of managers on their con-
tributions to the firms’ goals regarding diversity and equal employment op-
portunity; and (3) monitoring and analysis of employees’ perceptions of dis-
criminatory barriers and career opportunities.”135  The point is simply that 
employers can take steps to address the discrimination that results from deci-
sions based on stereotypes rather than an individual assessment.136  An em-
ployer that chooses not to take such steps intentionally maintains a discrimi-
natory system. 
In summary, a decisionmaker’s failure to make individual, rather than 
stereotyped, assessments of people is the result of a choice, and organizations 
(employers) can motivate decisionmakers to make accurate, individual as-
sessments.  Comments about a person based on his/her membership in a par-
ticular group of people – based on race, sex, age, religion or disability – ra-
ther than him/her as an individual are evidence of stereotyping as to a particu-
lar group of people.  When the comments are derogatory or negative, they 
suggest a negative perception of that group.  Maybe the categorization is “un-
conscious” at some point in the continuum of processes; however, we have a 
 133. Id. ¶ 48. 
 134. Id. ¶ 49. 
 135. Id. ¶ 50.  He goes on to describe the weaknesses of Wal-Mart’s policies and 
practices as to each of these three elements.  Id. ¶¶ 51-63. 
 136. The EEOC appointed a taskforce to study the best equal employment oppor-
tunity policies, programs and practices of private sector employers for the purpose of 
facilitating voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination laws.  See U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BEST PRACTICES OF PRIVATE SECTOR 
EMPLOYERS (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task_reports/
practice.html. 
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choice: consider and evaluate a person based on individual ability, character-
istics, skills, education and other relevant factors, or consider and evaluate a 
person based on his/her membership in a particular group and then apply to 
an individual our stereotypical assessment of persons in that group.  So, if a 
supervisor refers to an African-American employee in racially derogative 
terms, 137 that shows he categorizes African-Americans in a negative manner, 
i.e., stereotypes.  This then provides evidence that the supervisor, consciously 
or unconsciously, allows his decisions to be influenced by his negative per-
ceptions.  Even if the application of his stereotypes to a particular person is 
called unconscious, he made a conscious (intentional) decision at some point 
to evaluate African-Americans as members of a group that he views nega-
tively, not as individuals.  Thus, the negative effect of the stereotype on a 
particular decision is intentional. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROOF OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Social cognition theory adds to our psychological understanding of bias 
and the role of intent in making discriminatory decisions.  This may affect 
both efforts to avoid discrimination in making decisions and efforts to estab-
lish unlawful discrimination when a decision is challenged.  For example, an 
organization interested in avoiding discriminatory decisions should take pre-
ventative measures.  Those measures should address both the old-fashioned 
invidious discrimination where a decisionmaker consciously decides to reject 
a person in a protected group because of her race, gender, age or national 
origin, as well as what is now understood as unconscious discrimination 
where a decisionmaker rejects a person in a protected category because of 
negative, stereotypical views of certain categories of people and the failure to 
individuate when making such decisions.  Currently, laws, rules and policies 
aimed at preventing discrimination assume that discrimination is the result of 
a conscious decision made at the point of the decision.  Such laws, rules and 
policies do not work if much discrimination is unconscious, i.e., the deci-
sionmaker is not aware of it at the point of decision.  Unconscious discrimina-
tion must be addressed in advance through education and training that makes 
decisionmakers aware of how this type of discrimination works, by establish-
ing the framework for individualized decisionmaking that looks at the qualifi-
cations and merit of each candidate, and by providing incentives (motivation) 
to avoid the discrimination.  The failure of an organization to take such pre-
ventative steps will have adverse consequences in court when a decision of its 
 137. See Cooper v. Paychex, Inc., Nos. 97-1645, 97-1543, 97-1720, 1998 WL 
637274, at *2 n.1 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1998) (plaintiff’s secretary, who had complained 
about the plaintiff’s performance, used the term “nigger” in referring to African-
Americans and called the plaintiff a “lazy black ass”). 
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agent is challenged as discriminatory, as in harassment cases where the lack 
of a policy affects an employer’s defenses.138
Litigation in which a plaintiff alleges unlawful discrimination is likely to 
result in many erroneous decisions if the parties, the court and the jurors are 
not familiar with unconscious discrimination.  This is true because a system 
developed on one understanding of discrimination cannot be expected to 
work properly when addressing discrimination that, in many cases, functions 
very differently.  My suggested modifications to the litigation process in-
clude:
a)  greater use of expert psychological testimony,  
b)  clarification of the evidentiary role of comments in proving 
discrimination, and  
c)  changes in the established proof schemes utilized in discrimi-
nation cases, including  
(i)  greater use of the direct method of proof,  
(ii)  more appropriate assignment of the burden of proof, and  
(iii) treating mixed-motive as an affirmative defense.   
These suggestions will be addressed below. 
A.  Expert Testimony from Psychologists 
In order to make better, more reliable decisions in discrimination cases, 
all participants in the process need to understand the psychology of discrimi-
nation.  Plaintiffs need to determine their theory early, i.e., decide whether to 
present the case as one of “old-fashioned” intentional discrimination or one of 
unconscious discrimination.  The parties need to identify and disclose psy-
chologists as expert witnesses; lawyers and judges need to understand the role 
of such experts and be prepared to address their role and the admissibility of 
their testimony at a Daubert hearing;139 and these experts must educate the 
attorneys, judges and jurors in the psychology of discrimination.  Further, the 
 138. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (ab-
sence of reasonable care to prevent and  promptly correct harassing behavior elimi-
nates an affirmative defense).  
 139. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 
see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189, 191 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (applies a 
“lower Daubert standard” at the class certification stage); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 
984 F. Supp. 1257, 1259-60 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. 
Supp. 259, 301-03, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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party presenting the expert must offer evidence that corresponds to and sup-
ports the expert’s description of discrimination.  This means that an expert 
must be retained early in the litigation to inform the discovery process.140
While an expert can be very beneficial to a plaintiff, there are barriers.  
A professor of sociology who testifies about cognitive bias in employment 
discrimination litigation explains how organized the defense bar is in oppos-
ing expert testimony and questions why, in light of the “extensive arsenal 
available to the defense bar,” a “social scientist [would] even consider expos-
ing himself or herself to such intensive criticism.”141  Professor Bielby an-
swers the question by identifying an important reason why social scientists 
should consider being retained as experts:  
There is a substantial body of scientific knowledge on stereotyping 
and cognitive bias that really can assist the trier of fact in deciding 
whether certain kinds of employment discrimination occurred.  Re-
lying on that knowledge the expert can, for example, explain to a 
jury or judge how it is that, under certain circumstances, a highly 
decentralized personnel system can create company-wide barriers 
against women, and how, under other circumstances, specific kinds 
of policies and accountability can minimize the likelihood that 
such bias occurs to any significant degree.142
Given the cost of expert assistance and testimony, as well as the re-
sources it will take to address a Daubert motion, attorneys for plaintiffs have 
to assess carefully whether a case justifies the expenditure of such re-
sources.143  It may be that the use of experts will be less critical as the “new” 
 140. This is demonstrated by the report of Dr. Bielby in Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., in which he identifies the material he received in preparing his report.  
See Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Class 
Certification at ¶¶ 6-7, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (No. C-01-2252-MJJ), 2003 WL 24571701. 
 141. William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using Expert Testi-
mony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 377, 397 (2003). 
 142. Id.  Dr. Bielby also identifies benefits to the social scientist, including the 
fact that an opportunity to apply one’s work to the real world informs basic research, 
“generate[s] new insights into the resiliency of stereotypes and the kinds of account-
ability that are and are not successful in attenuating their effects,” and helps to dis-
cover new research questions.  Id. at 397-98. 
 143. The Court, in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 
(1991), held that expert witness fees could not be recovered by a prevailing party as 
part of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Congress responded, in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, by amending § 1988 and giving the court discretion to “include expert 
fees as part of the attorney’s fee” in actions to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1981a.  
42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006).  The 1991 Act also amended Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
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understanding of discrimination becomes more widely known and addressed 
in court opinions.  At that point, these opinions will become a source of edu-
cation and precedent.  So, as is often the case, the early litigation will pave 
the way for subsequent litigation. 
B.  Evidentiary Role of Comments 
1.  Rules of Evidence 
Comments made by agents of the defendant are currently used in cases 
where the plaintiff utilizes the direct method, where the plaintiff relies on the 
indirect method of proof and attempts to show pretext, and in mixed motive 
cases.144  An obvious example of direct evidence of discrimination is when 
the decisionmaker says, “I will not hire you because of your race, your age, 
your gender, your disability, or your religion.”  No inference is required and, 
if the trier of fact finds that this statement was made, the plaintiff needs no 
further evidence to prevail.  Such a statement alone proves invidious, inten-
tional discrimination; however, cases with evidence of such statements are 
quite rare today.  More common are cases where the plaintiff presents evi-
dence of derogatory comments about a protected group that do not state di-
rectly the reason for the challenged decision, but do reveal how the speaker 
stereotypes members of a protected group.  Such statements are made in dif-
ferent contexts, including:  (i) a statement made by the decisionmaker in the 
context of the challenged decision;145 (ii) a statement made by the decision-
maker, but not made in the context of the challenged decision;146 (iii) a state-
ment made by someone who played a meaningful role in the challenged deci-
sion, but was not the “official” decisionmaker;147 and (iv) a statement made 
by someone in the organization who is neither the decisionmaker nor one who 
§ 2000e-5(k), to include expert fees.  So, a prevailing plaintiff may recover expert 
fees, depending on the source of the claim. 
 144. See e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 145. See, e.g., Shorette v. Rite Aid of Me., Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(discriminatory statements related to the decisional process may be sufficient to prove 
an employer’s alleged discriminatory animus). 
 146. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 
(2000) (decisionmaker told plaintiff he “was so old [he] must have come over on the 
Mayflower,” and he “was too damn old to do [his] job,” but not in the direct context 
of the plaintiff’s discharge). 
 147. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 
2000) (we “look to who actually made the decision or caused the decision to be made, 
not simply to who officially made the decision” and “it is appropriate to tag the em-
ployer with an employee’s age-based animus if the evidence indicates that the worker 
possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker”). 
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played a meaningful role in the challenged decision.148  While the weight of 
the comments in the different categories may vary, all of these comments 
may be relevant and thus admissible. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence inform the admissibility inquiry in a 
number of ways.  Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”149
Where the issue is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against 
an applicant or employee based on any of the factors prohibited by federal 
law, evidence that the decisionmaker has made derogatory comments about a 
particular group of persons makes it more probable that the person took the 
prohibited characteristic into account in making the challenged employment 
decision about a member of the group.150
Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”151
Some courts find comments relevant, but exclude them under Rule 403 based 
on a determination that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
the probative value.152  While some derogatory comments may be inflamma-
tory, that does not mean statements containing such terms are unfairly preju-
dicial to the defendant in a discrimination case.  In fact, the more outrageous 
and inflammatory the terms, the stronger the speaker’s negative impression of 
the target group of people and the more likely it is that the speaker uses im-
permissible factors in making decisions.  Thus, the Rule 403 balance favors 
admissibility.153
Sometimes comments, even when made in the context of the challenged 
decision, are excluded or substantially discounted because the court finds 
them to be ambiguous.  For example, the Seventh Circuit held that use of the 
 148. See, e.g., Logan v. Kautex Textron N. Am., 259 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 
2001) (racist comment made by a co-worker does not create an inference that the 
plaintiff was discharged because of her race, even though the co-worker participated 
in a vote, along with five others, to discharge her). 
 149. FED. R. EVID. 401.  This is a fairly broad definition of relevant.  If the evi-
dence is relevant, it “is admissible, except as otherwise provided by [the Constitution, 
statute, or rules adopted by the Supreme Court].”  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 150. If such past comments are treated as character evidence, which is generally 
not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), the comments constitute 
“acts,” which are admissible to prove motive or intent, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b). 
 151. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 152. See, e.g., Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Greenfield v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-71086, 2006 WL 2927546, at *6-*9 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2006).  But see Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 
763, 769-71 (7th Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d 56, 64 
(1st Cir. 2001); Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 153. It should be excluded only “if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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term “bitch” may not be evidence of sex discrimination because it does not 
necessarily suggest anything derogatory about females.154  First, this seems 
wrong.  According to one dictionary, “bitch” is slang for “a. A mean or spite-
ful woman [and] b. A promiscuous woman.”155  Second, the jury, not the 
judge, should determine whether the use of this term is evidence of sex dis-
crimination.   Ambiguity in statements is normally a matter for the jury to 
resolve.156  Therefore, the jury should decide whether the term “bitch” is evi-
dence of sex discrimination and, if so, the amount of weight to give it.  As-
sume the decisionmaker in a sex discrimination case made the statement, “I 
had to fire the bitch,” in the context of explaining an employment decision to 
the Director of Human Resources.  Even if one believes that comment is am-
biguous, that comment alone should be sufficient to get the claim to the jury 
because a reasonable juror, based solely on this comment, could conclude that 
the employee’s gender was a motivating factor in her discharge.157
Even if a discriminatory comment is relevant, the plaintiff still has to es-
tablish that the comment should not be excluded as hearsay.  The hearsay 
rules recognize at least two ways of proving state of mind.  Derogatory com-
ments constitute circumstantial evidence of state of mind of the speaker and 
are not hearsay because they are not being offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  For example,    the statement, “older employees” are “set in their 
ways” and need to be “replaced with younger people” in order for the “com-
pany’s business to progress,”158 shows the declarant’s state of mind and 
should be admissible to prove age discrimination in a reduction-in-force case, 
even though the declarant did not make the statement in the context of select-
ing workers to be laid off as part of the reduction in force.  The statement 
 154. See, e.g., Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 
1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996) (reference to plaintiff as “sick bitch” was, in context, not a 
sex- or gender-related term; “there would not be an automatic inference from his use 
of the word ‘bitch’ that his abuse of a woman was motivated by her gender rather than 
by a personal dislike unrelated to gender”). 
 155. WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY (revised edition 1996). 
 156. See, e.g., Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990)) (if the discriminatory nature 
of the supervisor’s comments – plaintiff’s problems stemmed from the fact that she 
was trying to work “in a man’s world,” and “[i]f you leave right now, it will make a 
better life for you” – is ambiguous, “‘the task of disambiguating utterances is for trial, 
not for summary judgment’”). 
 157. While the decisionmaker usually denies having used the derogatory term, he 
could testify and attempt to convince the trier of fact that his use of the term is not 
indicative of stereotyping or intent to discriminate and the jury might accept this tes-
timony.  Even if he admits using the term and gives an explanation, the jury is not 
required to accept the explanation and would be justified in ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff.
 158. Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988). 
2008] IMPLICIT BIAS & INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 113
shows that the speaker thinks stereotypically about older workers and views 
them negatively.159
Statements directly indicating state of mind fit within a hearsay excep-
tion, Rule 803(3), which provides: “[a] statement of the declarant’s then ex-
isting state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health)” is not excluded 
by the hearsay rule.160  While Rule 803(3) only provides an exception to the 
hearsay rule and does not address relevance, it supports the argument that 
what people say can be used to determine their state of mind, motive or in-
tent.  When a statement indicating state of mind is made while the declarant is 
an agent of the employer, it is not necessary to rely on the Rule 803(3) excep-
tion because the statement is defined as nonhearsay by Rule 801(d)(2)(D).161
This rule makes any statement of an agent of a party nonhearsay, as long as 
the statement is within the scope of the agency and made during the existence 
of the relationship.  If the person making the statement is a party, then the 
statement is nonhearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A).162
 159. There are other common examples of circumstantial evidence of state of 
mind.  When the mental competency of the accused in a criminal case is at issue, the 
following statement made by the accused, “I am bin Laden,” is admissible as evidence 
of incompetence because it is not offered to show that the accused is in fact bin La-
den, but rather as circumstantial evidence of incompetence.  See CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 738 (3d ed. 2003).  Although not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, one could argue that hearsay risks are 
present because relevance depends on the sincerity of the speaker, i.e., it tells nothing 
about competency if the speaker was joking.  Similarly, in a will contest where the 
disfavored beneficiary claims the favored beneficiary improperly influenced the testa-
tor, the testator’s statement made prior to signing the will, “I am really proud of Sally 
[the favored beneficiary] for representing the local residents in challenging the power 
company’s pollution of the drinking water,” is admissible if offered by the favored 
beneficiary to show the state of mind of the testator.  This is not a direct statement of 
the testator’s state of mind and it is not offered to prove that the testator was proud of 
Sally, or that Sally represented the residents well, but it is relevant circumstantial 
evidence on the question of the testator’s state of mind in making the will, i.e., Sally 
was favored not because of duress but because the testator likes her.   
 160. An example of such a statement is “I plan to reduce the age of the workforce 
by getting rid of the older workers through a reduction-in-force and later replacing 
them with younger workers.” 
 161. “A statement is not hearsay if . . . offered against a party and is . . . (D) a 
statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.”  FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(D); see, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 162. “A statement is not hearsay if . . . offered against a party and is . . . (A) the 
party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity.”  FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). 
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2.  Weight to be Given to Comments 
The psychological research addressed above helps us understand and as-
sess the value of comments in proving discrimination.  For our purposes, the 
following points are most important: first, derogatory or negative comments 
about a person’s group, made in the context of making a decision about that 
person, are evidence that her group status played a role in the decision; sec-
ond, a person’s comment attributing characteristics to an individual based on 
her group membership, e.g., female, constitutes evidence of stereotyping, 
regardless of when the comment is made in relation to the challenged deci-
sion;163 third, such evidence of stereotyping constitutes direct evidence of 
discrimination,164 i.e., evidence that gender played a role in the challenged 
decision;165 and fourth, even if a decisionmaker’s use of stereotypes in mak-
ing a particular decision was not deliberate or fully conscious, at some point 
the decisionmaker made a deliberate choice to base decisions on stereotypes 
instead of individual assessments, thus satisfying the intent requirement.166
Each of these points will be discussed below. 
First, because a plaintiff utilizing the direct method may rely on circum-
stantial evidence,167 a derogatory comment, such as a racial slur made by a 
decisionmaker about African-Americans in the context of making the chal-
lenged decision, constitutes evidence of a race-based animus because that 
would be a reasonable inference.168  It would be up to the trier of fact to de-
termine whether to draw that inference and the weight to give to it - a deter-
mination that may be influenced by the comment’s proximity to the chal-
lenged decision.  But there can be no doubt that such a comment is probative 
on the question of whether race played a role in the challenged decision.  As 
stated in Price Waterhouse in the context of gender discrimination, 
“[r]emarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove 
that gender played a part in a particular employment decision.  The plaintiff 
must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its deci-
sion.  In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence
 163. This was recognized by at least five Justices in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
See 490 U.S. 228, 234-37, 251-52, 255-56 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 277-78 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 164. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
 165. The Court recognized this in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 151-54 (2000).  See also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52 (plural-
ity opinion). 
 166. See Fiske, supra note 18, at 254. 
 167. See, e.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
 168. See, e.g., Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2006); Vo-
lovsek v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 689-90 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
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that gender played a part.”169  Similarly, in Reeves, the Court indicated that 
the lower court “failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [the 
plaintiff].  For instance, while acknowledging ‘the potentially damning na-
ture’ of Chestnut’s age-related comments, the court discounted them on the 
ground that they ‘were not made in the direct context of Reeves’s termina-
tion.’”170
Second, when a decisionmaker makes a derogatory comment about a 
group, either in or out of the context of a challenged decision, it is reasonable 
to infer that the decisionmaker has a negative, stereotypical view of that 
group.171  Further, one can reasonably infer that this perceived negative group 
characteristic will adversely affect the decisionmaker’s evaluation or assess-
ment of an individual member of that group.  Assume that Boss, in a casual 
conversation outside the workplace, refers to African-Americans as “nig-
gers,” females as “bitches,” older persons as “old bastards” or Mexican-
Americans as “wetbacks.”  Most people hearing this conversation will form 
an opinion about how Boss views, and is likely to treat, members of the 
groups referred to in such derogatory terms.  You would not expect Boss, no 
matter the context in which he refers to African-Americans as “niggers,” to 
treat African-Americans on their individual merit when Boss is making work-
related decisions.172  In fact, the assumption would be the opposite – African-
Americans will be disadvantaged when Boss is making decisions in the 
workplace.  If this is true, then a derogatory comment made by Boss to a 
stranger in a casual conversation outside of the workplace should be admissi-
ble as evidence of race, sex or age discrimination in a case challenging an 
employment decision made by Boss. 
In other contexts, such a comment would be admissible.  For example, 
consider a situation similar to that presented in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, where 
the state seeks an enhanced sentence against the accused, an African-
American, because it believes the criminal act was directed at the victim, a 
Caucasian, because of the victim’s race.173  Assume the state has a witness 
 169. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.  
 170. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 152.  Chestnut told Reeves that he “was so old [he] must 
have come over on the Mayflower,” and that he “was too damn old to do [his] job,” 
when Reeves was having difficulty starting a machine.  Id. at 151. 
 171. If a decisionmaker makes a negative comment about a group, we can infer 
that she stereotypes individual members of that group and that such negative stereo-
typing will disadvantage members of that group when considered by this decision-
maker. 
 172. Of course, the employer could attempt to overcome the inference and present 
evidence to show that Boss follows the law when making decisions on behalf of the 
employer and is not influenced by the attitude reflected in the comments. 
 173. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (Mitchell’s sentence for aggra-
vated battery was enhanced, pursuant to Wisconsin’s penalty-enhancement statute, 
because he intentionally selected his victim because of race; application of the en-
hancement statute did not violate the First Amendment, which does not prohibit the 
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who for the past several years has worked with the accused and is prepared to 
testify that the accused commonly uses a derogatory term in the workplace 
when referring to Caucasians.  These workplace comments, which are unre-
lated to the criminal act, show a negative view of Caucasians.  One with such 
a view is more likely than one without such a view to take adverse actions 
against Caucasians based on their race.  Therefore, the comments are relevant 
in determining whether a Caucasian victim of a violent criminal act was se-
lected because of his or her race.  Of course, the trier of fact remains free to 
conclude that the act in issue was not motivated by race.  Similarly, the Boss’ 
comments, made to a stranger in a casual conversation, should be admissible 
in an employment discrimination case challenging an employment decision 
made by Boss.  In short, outside of the courtroom, people would generally 
rely on statements such as these in attempting to determine the intent of a 
person in making a decision.  To the extent that relevancy is a common sense 
notion,174 this argues in favor of admissibility, with the trier of fact determin-
ing the weight of the evidence in any particular situation. 
Third, one who engages in stereotyping is evaluating people based on 
their group membership, rather than their individual characteristics and merit.  
For example, if a “stereotyper” is deciding who to hire, candidate A, who is a 
member of a group that is viewed positively by the “stereotyper,” is likely to 
be selected over candidate B, who is a member of a group that is viewed ne-
gatively by the “stereotyper,” even if candidate B is better qualified based on 
objective factors.  This suggests candidate B did not get the job because of 
her or his group membership.  If B’s group membership is “protected” by 
statute or the Constitution, it seems that B has established discrimination and 
should get the job as a remedy, unless the employer shows it would have 
made the same decision even absent the stereotyping.175  However, if the law 
evidentiary use of speech to prove motive or intent).  But see Dawson v. Delaware, 
503 U.S. 159 (1992) (holding it was reversible error to instruct the jury that the de-
fendant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a “white racist gang,” because it 
was irrelevant and violated the first amendment).     
 174. Relevance requires a “relation between an item of evidence and a mat-
ter properly provable in the case,” and the existence of such a relation-
ship is to be determined by “principles evolved by experience or sci-
ence, applied logically to the situation at hand.”  In ruling upon rele-
vancy, the court must draw on its own experience, knowledge, and 
common sense in assessing whether a logical relationship exists be-
tween proffered evidence and the fact to be proven. 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 159, at 154-55 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401, 
Advisory Committee Notes). 
 175. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (a Title VII “mixed-
motive” case in which the plurality said “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, 
an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender;” the two concurring Justices, 
White and O’Connor, do not appear to disagree with this); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2006) (codifying the “mixed-motive” theory of liability and providing 
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relied upon by B requires a showing of intentional discrimination, there is a 
further question discussed below - whether such stereotyping is evidence of 
intentional discrimination in making this particular decision given the fact 
that the stereotyping may have been the result of unconscious negative feel-
ings and beliefs about a protected group. 
Fourth, as stated above, stereotyping is a form of categorization that op-
erates absent an intention to favor or disfavor a particular member of a group 
and these stereotypes bias a decisionmaker’s judgment before the point of an 
actual decision.  This means a challenged decision may have been the result 
of the operation of a decisionmaker’s biased judgment, but not an intentional 
or conscious decision to discriminate against the individual who is challeng-
ing the decision.  In the employment hypothetical discussed above, there was 
never an individualized assessment of candidate B’s qualifications because 
the decisionmaker saw no need to make such an assessment in light of his 
negative perception of candidate B’s group, which trumped individual merit.  
So, candidate B was the victim of her group membership because she was 
dealing with a decisionmaker who makes decisions about individuals based 
on their group membership and who had a negative perception of her group.   
If the law relied upon by candidate B in challenging the decision re-
quires her to show purposeful or intentional race discrimination, can she suc-
ceed?  Yes, according to Dr. Fiske, because the decisionmaker intentionally 
made a decision, at some point, not to “individuate” in selecting from among 
applicants for a position.  Even though “categorization is a natural and adap-
tive, even dominant, way of understanding other people, that does not mean 
that it is the only option available.”176  Whatever a decisionmaker knows or 
understands about stereotyping, and how it may operate unconsciously, a 
decisionmaker knows that he makes decisions about people without individu-
ating. 
Assuming any negative comment made by a decisionmaker about a 
group is relevant in determining whether a member of that group was a victim 
of discrimination, the next question is whether such a comment alone is suffi-
cient to create a jury question on the discrimination issue.  Assume a fifty-
five-year-old employee (plaintiff) is discharged during a reduction-in-force 
(RIF).  She is told she was selected rather than one of the other employees in 
her department, whose ages range from thirty-three to forty-eight, because the 
that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”); 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (holding that the plaintiff does 
not have to present direct evidence, as opposed to circumstantial evidence, in order to 
receive a mixed-motive instruction, i.e., the “plaintiff need only present sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice’”). 
 176. Fiske, supra note 18, at 277. 
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employer determined that while her performance was satisfactory, her rating 
was the lowest.  In fact, the latest performance evaluation shows her rating 
was slightly lower than others.  Further assume that the supervisor who se-
lected the plaintiff, during a meeting of management officials at which the 
need for a RIF was announced, said “older employees” are “‘set in their 
ways’” and need “‘to be replaced with younger people’ in order for the com-
pany’s business to progress.”177  If the court utilizes the indirect proof scheme 
and the summary judgment record contains sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case of age discrimination, the employer has articulated the le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given above, and the only evidence of 
pretext is the supervisor’s statement,178 is the employer entitled to summary 
judgment?  This depends on whether the trial judge believes a reasonable 
juror could infer, from the supervisor’s comment, that the employer’s articu-
lated reason for selecting the plaintiff for discharge is pretextual.  If the an-
swer is yes, then the case must be presented to the jury to determine whether 
the articulated reason is false and, if so, whether the employer is masking age 
discrimination.  So, the question is whether the inferences the jury might 
draw from the plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with the circumstantial 
evidence in the form of the age-related comment, is sufficient to support a 
finding of age discrimination in the selection of the plaintiff for discharge.  
This depends on how much the comment tells us about “the employer’s men-
tal processes.” 
The comment, “older employees” are “set in their ways” and need to be 
“replaced with younger people,” while not made in the context of selecting 
the plaintiff for discharge, certainly tells us how that supervisor views older 
workers.  Even without applying psychology, common sense suggests that 
one who views older workers in that manner is likely to take age into account 
when provided an opportunity to eliminate one or more workers as part of a 
RIF.  The same is true when the supervisor responsible for a challenged em-
ployment decision makes derogatory comments about a class of persons prior 
to making the employment decision.  A derogatory comment based on the 
race, national origin, gender, religion, disability or age of a class suggests, at 
a minimum, that the maker views members of that class as less desirable than 
others.  While one may be able to rise above such a bias, particularly when 
making a decision governed by a law prohibiting discrimination against the 
class at issue, all that means is evidence of the derogatory comment is not 
conclusive on the discrimination issue.  The real issue here is not whether the 
trier of fact should infer discriminatory motive from a comment such as the 
one above; rather, the issue is whether a reasonable jury could infer a dis-
 177. Castle v. Sangomo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 178. Note that the statement is admissible as nonhearsay, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), assuming someone who heard it supplies a declaration.  
See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).  Also, note that the 
statement was not made in the context of discharging the plaintiff; rather, it was made 
during a meeting announcing the RIF. 
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criminatory motive from the comment.179  Federal judges are very willing to 
take discrimination cases away from the jury, even after verdict.180  It may be 
that comments are often discounted by the federal courts because they are so 
powerful in determining intent and, if the cases are submitted to the jury, the 
jurors are likely to apply common sense and find discrimination based on 
such comments.  Such a common sense inference is supported by the psycho-
logical research discussed above. 
In employment cases alleging a violation of a federal antidiscrimination 
statute, the entity (employer) is the appropriate defendant and is liable for any 
relief obtained by the plaintiff.181  That means the wrongdoing of an em-
ployer’s agents is generally imputed to the entity182 and, therefore, the em-
ployer has an incentive to “encourage” its decisionmakers to avoid making 
employment decisions that can lead to liability under the antidiscrimination 
statutes.  An obvious step for employers to take is to require individual as-
sessments of candidates183 and provide decisionmakers with the training, 
 179. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that a statement by one involved in a challenged decision – indicating he took the 
plaintiff’s name off the list for a training program because she is female and “it was 
going to be a working trip, and he thought it would be dangerous and that [she] would 
thank him for it later” – was sufficient to preclude summary judgment). 
 180. This is consistent with a general trend in civil litigation in federal court.  
Summary judgment is the primary tool, but there are other tools.  See, e.g., Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (giving judges extensive discretion 
in determining whether an expert is allowed to testify); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman 
Tool, 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (holding that factual findings related to an award of puni-
tive damages are not insulated on appeal by the clearly erroneous standard). 
 181. Respondeat superior liability is not available in cases based on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983; rather, liability is imposed on the entity only if the challenged action was 
taken pursuant to entity “policy.”  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 
U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). 
 182. There is a limited exception in some harassment cases; in Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, the Court determined that where “no tangible employment action is tak-
en,” an employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages subject to 
proof of two elements:  a) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any harassing behavior, and b) the plaintiff failed to take advantage or any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.  524 U.S. 775, 807 
(1998); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (holding 
that an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), where decisions of its managerial agents are contrary to its 
good faith efforts to comply with the employment discrimination statute). 
 183. In determining that the University of Michigan law school admissions policy 
was narrowly tailored, the Court in Grutter v. Michigan, stressed that the policy re-
quired “individualized consideration” of all applicants “to ensure that each applicant 
is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or eth-
nicity the defining feature of his or her application.”  539 U.S. 306, 337-38 (2003).  
Similarly, an employer can require that all applicants be given “individualized con-
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detailed job descriptions that identify the relevant qualifications, and evalua-
tive forms needed to make such assessments.  The leaders of institutions and 
organizations that do not require such individualized consideration of appli-
cants make a choice to allow their decisionmakers to make decisions based on 
their stereotypes, i.e., to intentionally discriminate. 
C.  Modified Proof Scheme 
The current proof schemes utilized in discrimination cases in which 
plaintiffs allege disparate treatment are the direct method and the indirect 
method, with a mixed-motive defense available to the defendant.  These proof 
schemes were developed without taking into account psychologists’ current 
understanding of discrimination and how a decisionmaker may discriminate 
without being fully aware of the fact that he is categorizing people, often 
unconsciously, and then making decisions based on the categorization or ste-
reotyping.  Further, the direct method is frequently interpreted to require di-
rect evidence, thereby excluding circumstantial evidence.  If the direct me-
thod allows the use of both direct and circumstantial evidence, then there is 
really no need for the indirect method because the presumption it creates goes 
away in nearly all cases.  This leaves the plaintiff with a direct method case 
that includes any inferences reasonably drawn from the prima facie case un-
der the indirect method.  The mixed motive defense simply recognizes that 
many decisions are motivated by more than one factor and that the antidis-
crimination statutes were intended to eliminate the prohibited factors from the 
decisionmaking process.  These proof schemes do not take into account the 
current understanding of discrimination, including the role of intent and its 
location in the decisionmaking process.  Following is an attempt to address 
some of these issues and suggest a modified approach to cases alleging dispa-
rate treatment in violation of antidiscrimination statutes and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 
1.  Elimination of the distinct methods 
If the direct method of proof allows the use of both direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence,184 most cases with any chance of success under the 
indirect method have at least an equal chance of success under the direct me-
thod.  This is true because even when a court utilizes the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the indirect method, the presumption created by the prima 
facie case rarely survives the minimal burden of production that shifts to the 
defendant, i.e., to produce admissible evidence that the plaintiff was rejected 
sideration” so that their race, or other protected group membership, does not become 
the “defining feature” of their applications.  Id.
 184. See Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th 
Cir. 2006).
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for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Rarely, if ever, does a defendant 
lose because it failed to satisfy this burden.  So, in reality, the primary advan-
tage to the plaintiff of the indirect method, the presumption, disappears in 
most cases and “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times 
with the plaintiff.”185  Many cases are resolved in favor of the defendant, on 
summary judgment, either at the first step, because the plaintiff fails to estab-
lish a prima facie case, or at the third step, because the plaintiff fails to pre-
sent sufficient evidence that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the defendant or that the defendant’s articulated reason(s) was not its true 
reason(s), but was a pretext for discrimination.   
Reeves and Hicks establish that while the plaintiff loses the benefit of 
the presumption created by the prima facie case, “the trier of fact may still 
consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case ‘and infer-
ences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s 
explanation is pretextual.’”186  This provides no advantage over the direct 
method, because it too includes inferences if it allows the use of circumstan-
tial evidence.  At the third step, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence 
to support a finding that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or that the defendant’s asserted justification is false (a pretext).  The 
trier of fact may, based on the evidence of pretext combined with the prima 
facie case, find unlawful discrimination.187  Of course, the plaintiff may pre-
sent other evidence of discrimination, such as the comments in Reeves.
Therefore, all evidence relied upon by the indirect method plaintiff, in both 
step one and step three, is either direct or circumstantial evidence.  The net 
effect of the indirect method, therefore, is to force the defendant to do what it 
must, as a practical matter, do anyhow, i.e., give a nondiscriminatory rea-
son(s) for the challenged decision.188  If this is correct, meaning the indirect 
method actually does nothing for either party in most cases, why use it?189
 185. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).. 
 186. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quot-
ing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). 
 187. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 
 188. Presumably, this reason(s) will have to be disclosed during discovery so the 
presumption does not require the defendant to do anything it will not be required to do 
during the course of the litigation.  In addition, the reason(s) is usually articulated in 
response to an EEOC charge or an application for unemployment compensation bene-
fits.
 189. In a case alleging a violation of the ADA, the court in Timmons v. General 
Motors Corp. recognized the practical similarity of the plaintiff’s burden under the 
direct and indirect methods of proof, stating: “[w]hat is always true, however, is that 
whatever evidence or method of proof the plaintiff resorts to, he must put together a 
case that permits the inference that the employer has acted against him based on his 
disability.”  469 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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2.  Assigning the burden of proof 
In most civil litigation, the plaintiff has the initial burden of going for-
ward with the evidence and presenting sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
jury to find for the plaintiff on each element of the claim by a preponderance 
of the evidence.190  If the plaintiff does not satisfy that burden, then judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of the defendant is appropriate.191  If the plaintiff 
satisfies the initial burden, then the burden of production shifts to the defen-
dant and the amount of evidence needed to satisfy that burden depends on the 
strength of the plaintiff’s case.  For example, if the plaintiff’s evidence is so 
strong that a reasonable jury could not decide in favor of the defendant, then 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law unless the defendant pro-
duces sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the 
defendant.  If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the plaintiff 
may, but is not required to, present rebuttal evidence.  However, if the evi-
dence presented by the defendant is so strong that a reasonable jury could no 
longer decide in favor of the plaintiff, then the burden of production shifts to 
the plaintiff to bring the evidence back into the jury range and avoid judg-
ment as a matter of law.  Throughout, the plaintiff retains the burden of per-
suasion, while the burden of production, which is managed by the court, 
shifts.  The law may create presumptions that benefit one party or the other 
during that trial process.192
Not all civil cases follow this “normal” path.193  Nothing prevents the 
courts, in discrimination cases litigated under the direct method, from shifting 
the burden of persuasion under certain circumstances.  This is particularly 
true in mixed-motive cases where the “employer’s burden is most appropri-
ately deemed an affirmative defense:  the plaintiff must persuade the fact-
finder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must per-
suade it on another.”194  In Price Waterhouse, a mixed-motive case, after the 
plaintiff proved that “her gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision,” the Court shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant to 
prove “it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the 
 190. This is commonly referred to as presenting a prima facie case. 
 191. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
 192. In civil cases litigated in federal court, the effect of presumptions is governed 
by Federal Rule of Evidence 301, except where state law supplies the rule of decision 
as to a claim or defense and then state law also governs the effect of presumptions.  
See FED. R. EVID. 302. 
 193. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 263-64 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing tort cases in which the burden of persuasion is 
shifted to the defendants to prove they did not cause the plaintiff’s injury).
 194. Id. at 246 (plurality opinion).  See also concurring opinions of Justice White, 
id. at 259-60, and Justice O’Connor, id. at 263-68.
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plaintiff’s gender into account.”195  Similarly, in Mount Healthy City Board 
of Education v. Doyle, the Court held that if the plaintiff in a First Amend-
ment case shows that protected expression played a role in the employer’s 
decision to discharge him, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to 
show it would have made the same decision even if it had not been motivated 
to retaliate against the employee for exercise his First Amendment rights.196
In another case, Castaneda v. Partida, based on the stark statistical dispari-
ty197 established by the plaintiffs, the Court shifted the burden of proof “to 
the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination.”198  Sometimes 
it is difficult to determine whether “burden of proof” means “burden of per-
suasion” or “burden of production,”199 but it is quite apparent that it means 
burden of persuasion in the mixed-motive cases.
Given the psychological research discussed above in Part III, there is 
justification for shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant whenever 
the plaintiff offers evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defen-
dant’s agents who make decisions (a) engage in stereotyping, and (b) have a 
negative view of persons in the plaintiff’s protected group.  Of course, psy-
chological research shows that most, if not all, people categorize based on 
race, gender, age, national origin and other characteristics.  Therefore, expert 
testimony would satisfy the first prong.  Group-based comments by deci-
sionmakers, or their tolerance of such comments by others in the workplace, 
also would satisfy this prong.  The second prong could also be supported by 
expert testimony, as in Price Waterhouse, as well as more specific and direct 
evidence – e.g., comments made by decisionmakers.  When comments are 
offered to show that decisionmakers have a negative view of a group, or 
groups, of people, it does not matter when or where the comments were 
made; proximity to the challenged decision should only affect the weight the 
trier of fact gives to the comments.  Similarly, comments made by decision-
makers not involved in the challenged decision show that stereotyping is ac-
cepted by the defendant, but the trier of fact might assign less weight to such 
 195. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2006); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 97 (2003). 
 196. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
 197. Although the “population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, . . . 
over an 11-year period, only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service 
were Mexican-American.”  Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).  
 198. Id. at 497-98. 
 199. See Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. 
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-78 (1994) (discussing the history of the 
meaning of “burden of proof” and indicating when it is used with a reference to the 
standard of proof it usually means burden of persuasion. 
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comments than the comments of those who actually made the challenged 
decision.200
If the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to support a finding of a) and 
b), the burden of persuasion should shift to the defendant to establish an af-
firmative defense by showing:  
(i)  the decisionmaker individuated in making the challenged de-
cision, thereby trumping the negative stereotype, and there was a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision,  
(ii)  even if the decisionmaker did not individuate, an individual-
ized assessment of the candidates would have resulted in the same 
decision,201 or
(iii)  the decisionmaker(s) acted contrary to company policy and 
training in failing to make an individual decision, instead of stereo-
typing.202
The effect of the defendant meeting its burden, i.e., presenting sufficient evi-
dence for the trier of fact to find (i), (ii) or (iii), depends on which prong(s) it 
satisfies.  If the defendant satisfies the first prong, by showing the decision-
maker(s) in fact individuated and there was a nondiscriminatory reason for 
rejecting the plaintiff, then the defendant wins.  There would be no liability 
because neither the plaintiff’s race nor the decisionmaker’s stereotyping was 
a factor in the decision.  However, if the defendant satisfies the second prong, 
by showing it would have reached the same decision even if the decision-
maker had individuated, it should still be held liable but the relief should be 
limited and not include lost wages and benefits, injunctive relief requiring the 
defendant to hire or reinstate the plaintiff, or punitive damages.203  Even the 
limited relief allowed goes beyond Price Waterhouse and Mt. Healthy,204 as 
 200. The same is true of comments made by those who are not decisionmakers; if 
the evidence shows such comments are tolerated by decisionmakers, it is up to the 
trier of fact to decide what weight to give to such comments. 
 201. This is essentially the mixed-motive defense discussed in the next subsec-
tion.
 202. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
 203. Compensatory damages would be available if, for example, the plaintiff 
shows mental or emotional distress resulting from a decision based on a negative 
stereotype of her group.  See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (author-
izing compensatory damages resulting from a deprivation of procedural due process, 
even where the challenged decision was correct). 
 204. In these cases, the Court held that establishing the mixed-motive defense 
defeats liability. 
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well as the 1991 amendment to Title VII.205  The reason for such relief – de-
claratory relief, limited injunctive relief, compensatory damages, costs and 
fees – even though the stereotyping did not result in a different decision, is to 
compensate the plaintiff for any injury resulting from the stereotyping, usu-
ally mental and emotional distress, and give the defendant an incentive to 
take strong preventative measures.  Finally, if the defendant satisfies the third 
prong, by showing the decisionmaker acted contrary to company policy and 
training in failing to make an individual assessment, it is still liable but not 
for punitive damages.206
3.  Mixed-motive as a defense 
A mixed-motive should be viewed strictly as an affirmative defense to 
be raised by the defendant.207  Plaintiffs do not have to anticipate affirmative 
defenses and should not have to do so in discrimination cases.  The mixed-
motive theory does not provide plaintiffs with an alternative proof scheme; 
rather, it provides defendants with at least a partial defense.  If the plaintiff 
shows that a prohibited factor was a motivating factor in the challenged deci-
sion, then the plaintiff prevails but the relief may be diminished if the defen-
dant has pleaded and carries its burden of persuasion showing it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken into account the prohibited 
factor.208  This is consistent with Desert Palace, in which the Court clarified 
that circumstantial evidence alone, which is sufficient for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a “motivating 
factor” in the challenged decision, shifts the burden of persuasion to the de-
 205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006) (allowing the court, where both 
parties have met their burden in a mixed-motive case, to award declaratory and in-
junctive (excluding hiring or reinstatement) relief and costs, including fees, but not 
damages). 
 206. This adopts the Kolstad v. American Dental Association approach, where the 
defendant’s policy and good faith efforts to comply with the law eliminate only puni-
tive damages, 529 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999), rather than the Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton approach, where the defendant’s policy eliminates liability.  524 U.S. 775, 807-
08 (1998). 
 207. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 208. While the Supreme Court cases recognizing the mixed-motive theory, Price
Waterhouse and Desert Palace, both involved claims based on Title VII, which was 
amended in 1991 to codify the mixed-motive theory, lower courts have extended the 
theory to ADEA cases.  See, e.g., Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352 
(5th Cir. 2005).  Price Waterhouse was decided two years before Title VII was 
amended and both the plurality and Justice White, in his concurring opinion, found 
support for shifting the burden in a retaliation case alleging a violation of the First 
Amendment.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-49, 258-59 (1989) 
(citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).  
Therefore, while there is support for the mixed-motive analysis in cases other than 
those based on Title VII, the law is further developed in Title VII cases. 
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fendant to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of 
the prohibited motivating factor.  In a Title VII case, if the defendant is suc-
cessful in establishing this affirmative defense, it is not absolved of liability; 
rather, the remedies available to the plaintiff are limited.209  Discrimination 
cases not based on Title VII should not be bound by its statutory exclusion of 
damages.210
4.  Application of proof scheme 
To illustrate, assume a male (Jack) was selected to fill a position as an 
emergency medical technician (EMT) over a female (Mary), even though 
their objective qualifications were equal.  The person who made the decision 
is a male (Bill).  In responding to the charge filed with the EEOC, the em-
ployer stated that while both Jack and Mary are qualified, Jack was selected 
because his prior EMT experience was more relevant to the duties of the open 
position.  While investigating the charge, the EEOC representative spoke to a 
number of employees who worked under the supervision of Bill and one of 
them reported that she heard Bill say, several months before Jack was se-
lected, that he believes males make better EMTs because they are stronger 
and less emotional in stressful circumstances.  This comment, whenever it 
was made, shows that Bill has a negative stereotyped impression of female 
EMTs.  Utilizing the indirect method, Mary can establish a prima facie case 
and the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason – better qualifi-
cations – so the issue will be whether a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or the employer’s reason is a pretext for sex dis-
crimination.  To show pretext, Mary will rely primarily on the comment made 
by Bill.  Under the direct method, Mary relies primarily on the comment 
made by Bill, which should be sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to 
the employer to show that it would have made the same decision even absent 
the stereotyping by its agent, Bill.  Under either method, Mary should survive 
summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find that Bill based his 
decision on his stereotypical view of women; in other words, he did not con-
sider Mary as an individual but rather judged her based on his preconceived 
notions of women as EMTs. 
Now assume that the comment was not made by Bill but rather by Bill’s 
supervisor, the general manager, who played no direct role in the challenged 
decision.211  Evidence of the general manager’s comment may still be suffi-
 209. The restriction on remedies is codified in Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
 210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
 211. Courts recognize that persons without a direct role in or formal authority to 
make a decision may influence the decision.  See, e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Tr. of the 
Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2007) (“we have held that where an em-
ployee without formal authority to materially alter the terms and conditions of a plain-
tiff’s employment nonetheless uses her ‘singular influence’ over an employee who 
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cient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden, for at least two reasons: first, if there is 
evidence that Bill was aware of the comment, or a similar comment made by 
the general manager at another time, when he made the challenged decision, 
that is sufficient for a trier of fact to find that Bill was motivated to stereotype 
in order to please his supervisor; and second, the comment, whenever it was 
made, could lead to a finding that the employer, through its high-ranking 
officials, discounts the value of female EMTs and, therefore, does not hire 
them because they are female.  Of course, the employer would have an oppor-
tunity to present evidence in an effort to show that the stereotype reflected in 
the comments did not affect the challenged decision or, even if it did, it would 
have made the same decision even absent the negative stereotype directed at 
female EMTs.   
V. CONCLUSION
Laws passed in an attempt to deal with traditional, old-fashioned dis-
crimination should be revisited and modified to reflect the current psycho-
logical understanding of discrimination.  Even short of a legislative change, 
proof schemes developed by the courts need to be revisited and modified to 
reflect the current understanding.  If either of these changes is made, organi-
zations will be motivated to revise their efforts to prevent even unconscious 
discrimination and encourage their decisionmakers to make decisions based 
on individual assessments rather than taking short-cuts and basing decisions 
on an individual’s group status.   
does have such power to harm the plaintiff for racial reasons, the actions of the em-
ployee without formal authority are imputed to the employer and the employer is in 
violation of Title VII”). 
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